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BAR BRIEFS
ceptible of further and possibly dangerous application. Suppose a Congress and President bent on doing something which
the Supreme Court deems contrary to the Constitution. They
pass a statute. A case arises under it. The court on the
hearing of the case unanimously declares the statute to be
null, as being beyond the powers of Congress. Congress
forthwith passes and the President signs another statute
more than doubling the number of justices. The President
appoints to the new justiceships men who are pledged to hold
the former statute constitutional. The Senate confirms his
appointments. Another case raising the validity of the disputed statute is brought up to the Court. The new Justices
outvote the old ones; the statute is held valid; the security
provided for the protection of the Constitution is gone like
a morning mist.
"What prevents such assaults on the fundamental lawassaults which, however immoral in substance, would be perfectly legal in form? Not the mechanism of government, for
all its checks have been evaded. Not the conscience of the
legislature and the President, for heated combatants seldom
shrink from justifying the means by the end. Nothing but
the fear of the people, whose broad good sense and attachment to the great principles of the Constitution may generally
be relied on to condemn such a perversion of its forms. Yet
if excitement has risen high over the country, a majority of
the people may acquiesce; and then it matters little whether
what is really a revolution be accomplished by openly violating or by merely distorting the forms of law. To the
people we come sooner or later; it is upon their wisdom and
self-restraint that the stability of the most cunningly devised
scheme of government will in the last resort depend."
Opponents of the President's proposal object to it on the
ground that it would make the Supreme Court subservient to the
President. And, yet, some of them would substitute, for the
President's proposal, one which would make any act of Congress
constitutional if, after having been declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court, it should be reapproved or reenacted by
two-thirds of the Congress. A proposed constitutional amendment, having the purpose and effect last mentioned, is now pending. This proposal would substitute a new form of subserviency
for that proposed by the President; it would make the Supreme
Court subservient to the Congress, rather than to the President.
Any proposal to make the Supreme Court subservient to either the President or the Congress should provide thinking people
with food for thought, particularly those who belong to classes
who have been subject, in the past, and may, again, be subject to
class persecution.
CONSTITUTION PROTECTS MINORITIES
It should be remembered that the provisions of the Bill of
Rights in the Constitution were designed to protect minorities
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from the fanaticism of temporary majorities, in respect of matters
that closely affect the life, the conscience and the well-being of the
citizen. What those guarantees are and how they are protected
will be explained in our next number, as space will not permit it in
this one.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In Anton J. Kary, vs. N. D. Workmen's Compensation Bureau,
From Morton County.
That the only injury for which an employee may recover compensation from the Workmen's Compensation Bureau under the
Workmen's Compensation Act is one "arising in the course of employment." (Section 396a2 of the Supplement.)
That Plaintiff was employed by the county in grading and
improving a highway, and furnished horses and his own labor in
driving a grader. After his work had ceased, and at some distance from his field of labor, he was injured while en route home
on the public highway. Held, plaintiff is not entitled to compensation from defendant for such injury as the injury did not arise
"in the course of employment."
In G. W. Jones Lumber Company, a Corporation, vs. City of Marmarth, a Municipal Corporation, From Slope County.
That a judgment against a city for breach of duty, negligence,
and wrongful acts or omission on the part of the city is not such
a debt or indebtedness as is governed by section 18 of the Constitution of this State which provides that the "debt of any * * *
city * * * shall never exceed five per centum upon the assessed
value of the taxable property therein. * * * All bonds and obligations in excess of the amount of indebtedness permitted by this
Constitution, given by any city, * * * shall be void."
That where a judgment has been rendered against a city on
account of its "negligence or breach of duty in the levy or collection of * * * special assessments," the city may, under the provisions of chapter 196"of the Session Laws of 1935, compromise and
find such judgment by the issuance of bonds "payable in stated annual installments over a period of years, not exceeding
twenty-five, and at a rate of interest not exceeding five per cent
per annum", provided that the judgment creditor agrees to a compromise of such judgment wherein and whereby at least twentyfive per cent of the judgment is rebated. In such event, under
the provisions of said-chapter, the city may agree to "levy a direct
annual and irrepealable tax sufficient in amount to pay the principal and interest of said bonds as they severally mature."
That such bonds may be issued without reference to the constitutional limitations set forth in section 183 of the State Constitution.

